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Vietnam: The Options Narrow

THE EDITORS

Pakistan: Swing to the Right

FEROZ AHMED

Chile: An Unprecedented Situation

BY TWO CORRESPONDENTS

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Please be sure to read the announcement beginning on page 1 of this issue, and please think seriously about what you can do to help. Financial troubles are part of the normal way of life for all radical undertakings: if we didn't have them, we'd have to suspect we were doing something wrong. But they also have to be coped with as they arise, and for this purpose the radical movement has only its own resources to draw upon.

The announcement points out that we are going to have to do some retrenching, for a while at least, in the acceptance of articles, book manuscripts, and translations. Also we are going to cut down on the amount of time and effort devoted to correspondence which in recent years has

(Continued on inside back cover)

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ANNOUNCEMENT

In the annual Monthly Review Associates appeal letter sent out last September, it was pointed out that the magazine's subscription rate had remained unchanged since May 1969. During this period the consumer price index has risen from an average of 109.8 in 1969 to 126.9 at the latest reading, an increase of over 15 percent. And of course costs have risen in a similar way.

The appeal letter emphasized our concern to avoid a rate increase and left it to subscribers to determine whether or not this would be possible. The deficit was growing, it was pointed out, and the unusually large issues of June and July-August, 1972, had aggravated the problem. If the response to the appeal were large enough to cover the deficit, the rate would remain the same. Otherwise it would have to go up beginning with the new volume (no. 25) on May 1, 1973.

Enough time has now passed to allow us to report that while the response to the appeal has been good (the increased income over last year through December is about 7 percent), it has unfortunately fallen short of covering the deficit. The sub rate will therefore have to be raised beginning with the issue of May 1973 (volume 25, number 1) from the present $7 annually ($8 foreign) to $9 annually ($10 foreign). The special

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student rate which is now $5 will rise to $7. Individual copies will go up from 75¢ to 85¢. And MR will follow a practice which is rapidly spreading among periodical publications of instituting a special multi-user rate schedule for libraries and other institutions. These increases will fall far short of covering the deficit, but we anticipate that they will reduce it to the point where it can be covered by the 1973 Associates appeal.

The reader will notice that the present issue is 48 pages instead of the normal 64. This is an economy measure which may have to be repeated from time to time in the future. In these circumstances we shall naturally have to be more selective in accepting material submitted for publication in the magazine. In particular we expect to be making fewer exceptions than we have in the past to our "standard length" rule of a 5,000-word maximum for articles and 3,000 for reviews. Manuscripts which greatly exceed these lengths will normally be returned without comment.

Financial problems are unfortunately not confined to the magazine. For many months we have been sending free literature, mostly books, to prisoners. Readers' contributions to our Prisoners' Fund have helped to ease the burden, but a considerable financial drain continues. Furthermore, owing no doubt to the decline of the radical Left in the last two or three years, the sale of left books has been hard hit. Some commercial publishers who jumped into the field in a big way in the late 1960s have departed just as hastily, their dream of quick profits having proved short-lived or altogether illusory. MR Press has also suffered from this change in the political climate, though in a much less drastic fashion. We published an extraordinarily large list of new cloth-bound and paperback books in 1972, anticipating stronger sales than actually materialized. The result was not a decline in sales but a failure of revenue to rise in proportion to outlays—in other words an inadequate cash flow to continue the kind of publishing program we had built up to.

How serious this situation is or how long it will last depends on factors evidently beyond anyone's control. In the meantime, certain measures of retrenchment are unavoidable. The future publication list will be cut back by postponing the release of some titles and accepting fewer new submittals. Above

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all, we shall have to cut down on the number of translations from foreign languages. We have regarded the publication of translations of significant radical works as one of the Press's most important functions. But they are very expensive, and after the translations now in process have been published, we will have no choice but to curtail this part of our program.

The troubles of both the magazine and the Press derive from the absence of any reserves to fall back on in a period of relative adversity. It is not a case of undercapitalization but of no capitalization at all. This suggests that if in the longer run the U.S. Left wants to support and maintain a strong publishing house which will not be vulnerable to temporary ups and downs in the economic and political environment, it will have to find the means to provide an adequate capital base. If any of you to whom this is addressed have ideas as to how this might be accomplished, we would be glad to hear from you. But for now it is clear that we must rely on a combination of our own efforts to economize and your help in easing the present squeeze. We urge you to:

(1) Join the Associates if you have not already done so (details on the back cover), or add to your contribution if you have already joined.

(2) Renew your sub at once, taking advantage of the present rates which will remain in force until May 1 (see page 4).

(3) Give one or more gift subs (see page 4).

(4) Take it upon yourself to persuade others (both individuals and libraries) to subscribe to the magazine and to buy MR Press books.

We are in a difficult period for the Left. But sooner or later there will be a revival and, we are confident, unprecedented growth in numbers and militancy. Given the utter failure and inability of capitalism to solve the increasingly serious problems which are pressing in upon us, there has to be. In the meantime, we must not let the achievements of the past, to which we believe MR and MR Press have made a solid if modest contribution, be overwhelmed. We will do our part to ensure that this does not happen, and we earnestly ask for your generous cooperation.

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VIETNAM: THE OPTIONS NARROW

The breakdown of the peace negotiations in mid-December followed almost immediately by the heaviest bombing of the Vietnam war in the Hanoi-Haiphong area came as a profound shock to the American people who had been lulled into a sense of false optimism by Kissinger's pre-election "peace is at hand" statement and by a steady stream of press reports predicting imminent "breakthroughs" when the negotiations resumed in November. The entire Left, joined by such liberals as Tom Wicker and Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times,* reacted with horror and indignation. In a column entitled "Vietnam Delenda Est"—alluding to the infamous Roman cry "Carthage Must Be Destroyed"—Wicker wrote (December 23):

> To send B-52s against populous areas such as Haiphong or Hanoi can have only one purpose: terror. . . . An English newspaper that has taken a moderate line on the war, *The Guardian,* asked this week: "Does Mr. Nixon want to go down in history as one of the most murderous and bloodthirsty of American presidents?" But it no longer matters what he wants. The facts assure that he will be so recorded.

But it was by no means only radicals and liberals who were shocked by Nixon's actions. *Business Week,* normally as unmoved by the evils of the world as its profit-oriented readers, editorialized (January 6):

> Rarely have the people of the U.S. been let down so hard so fast. Last October, peace in Vietnam, according to presidential aide Henry Kissinger, was at hand. By mid-December, peace was again off somewhere at the end of a long, bloody trail, and the President had ordered bombing of Vietnam on a scale greater than ever. Public sentiment, long divided, was for once almost unified—by a feeling of sick frustration.

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Hardly anyone, and least of all Nixon himself, attempted to justify the bombings; and even the Pentagon could do no better than hope that a barrage of lies would successfully hide the awful reality. Vain hope. Not only did the Vietnamese themselves broadcast the facts to the world but numerous foreigners on the spot—newspapermen, diplomats, a visiting group of well-known Americans—bore witness to the truth of their accounts. From all over the globe came expressions of horror and revulsion. A reporter in Rome quoted a professor of English literature who had visited the United States many times as saying: "America during those terrible last few weeks when the B-52s were pounding Hanoi has shown us a face that we hadn't known to exist, and it deeply frightened and repelled us." (*New York Times,* January 3) Even the normally docile Canadian government, to forestall stronger action advocated by opposition parties, felt it necessary to introduce into the House of Commons a resolution condemning the bombing. It passed without a dissenting vote. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the whole world instinctively recognized the truth as stated by Wilfred Burchett in a dispatch from Paris following the resumption of the bombing: "President Nixon and Henry Kissinger have made criminal history."* (*Guardian,* December 27)

But emphasis on this aspect of the whole situation, thoroughly justified as it is, has tended to obscure or even distort other aspects no less deserving of attention. For example, the French novelist Vercors—in an article in *Le Monde,* published in translation in the *New York Times* of January 5th—is so passionately preoccupied with the bombings, comparing them to Hitler's wanton attacks on Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coventry, that he completely misinterprets what lies behind the actions of Nixon and his advisers:

Seeing that Russia doesn't dare anything, that China can't, that Europe doesn't want to, Mr. Nixon and his Pentagon feel themselves all-powerful, and this power intoxicates them. They

* It is always necessary to add that the whole history of imperialism is, in this sense, criminal history. What Nixon has done in Vietnam has been done again and again by all the imperialist powers during the last four centuries, the chief difference being that the technological means of killing and destroying have never been so great as those possessed by the United States today.

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feel they are masters of the world. They know that they can, if they want, do ten times worse than Hitler, without risking the same fate, and this power intoxicates them.

The reality is very different. Far from feeling masters of the world, Nixon and his Pentagon realize that they have utterly failed to master Vietnam, South or North; and they are reacting wildly, like cornered rats, hoping against hope to regain a measure of control over a situation that, from their point of view, has steadily deteriorated ever since Nixon entered the White House. For the truth is that December's unprecedented outburst of violence produced not a U.S. victory but the latest and in some ways the worst U.S. defeat.

Here it is necessary to see events in perspective. The Tet offensive in 1968 precipitated the first major crisis of the war inside the United States. The military demanded a huge addition to the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. The growing strength of the antiwar movement and sharp divisions within his administration forced Johnson to refuse. The crisis was resolved by the opening of the Paris peace talks and Johnson's retirement from the political scene. Nixon, elected on a pledge to end the war, had to recognize the necessity of withdrawing American ground forces and "Vietnamizing" the war (November 1969). When this gave every sign of failing, he was rash enough to commit remaining U.S. troops to the invasion of Cambodia (May 1970), a decision which triggered the greatest antiwar explosion the country had ever seen. Nixon's only recourse now was to re-escalate the U.S. involvement via air and naval power. The rout of the attempted invasion of Laos in the winter of 1971, however, showed that even with massive American air support the Saigon army was completely incapable of offensive action. The initiative now passed wholly to the other side, and it was grasped with characteristic tactical brilliance in the 1972 spring offensive. The Saigon forces crumbled under the first blows, and it was only by means of the greatest air and naval bombardments in history that the Thieu regime was propped up with a semblance of stability; underneath the surface not only were his troops being chewed up and dispersed but also most of the countryside was brought under the firm political and military control of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG).

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It was this situation which set the stage for the intensified negotiations of last October leading to the completion of the draft agreement which prompted Kissinger's "peace is at hand" statement. At this stage, there is not too much firm information about what went on behind the scenes, but we believe it is possible to piece together a plausible account on the basis of what we do know, provided only that we are willing to make the assumption that both sides have been acting in ways we have by now become familiar with from the past history of this prolonged conflict.*

As indicated above, by the end of the summer of 1972 the Vietnamese liberation forces were in a basic position of strength, while the Saigon regime was being kept alive only by U.S. bombing on a scale never before even approached in the history of warfare. Under these conditions Hanoi and the PRG could afford to modify their long-standing peace terms by dropping the demand that military and political issues should be resolved simultaneously and that Thieu would therefore have to resign and be replaced by a new tripartite government in South Vietnam before a cease-fire could go into effect. The only price they now demanded for a cease-fire was U.S. withdrawal, to take place along with repatriation of American POWs. The liberation forces evidently calculated that this would so weaken Thieu that the collapse and disappearance of his regime would more or less speedily follow.

Nixon was now confronted with a choice. He could accept the modified Vietnamese terms, claiming not altogether implausibly that they were substantially what he himself had offered last May in his TV speech announcing the mining of North Vietnamese harbors. (Several reporters have noted that these terms were also in line with what Kissinger had proposed in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1969.) This would mean accepting the possibility that Thieu would go under in the ensuing political struggle, which in turn would mean the defeat of the fundamental U.S. war aim of maintaining a puppet state in South Vietnam. The other alternative open to Nixon was

* In this connection it would be hard to exaggerate the importance of the Pentagon Papers as a source of understanding the workings of the U.S. government and the thought processes of its civilian and military leaders.

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to reject the Vietnamese concessions and continue the war in the hope of gaining still further concessions at some time in the future. What actually happened, it seems, is that in October Nixon opted for the first alternative and then in November changed his mind in favor of the second.

There are of course those who believe that Nixon never intended to sign the October draft agreement and that the whole performance was staged for electoral purposes. In this view the November reversal represented Nixon's real position all the time. This would provide a consistent explanation of what happened but in our judgment not a convincing one. Given the decisive lead over McGovern which the public opinion polls had consistently shown all summer,* Nixon can hardly have thought it necessary to indulge in a last-minute election spectacular. And he is too shrewd a politician not to know that such tricks have a cost which has to be balanced against the likely benefits. In this case the cost would consist of at least three elements: first, raising and then deceiving the hopes of the American people for an early peace and return of the POWs; second, reducing further Nixon's already shaky credibility; and third, gravely injuring the image and future usefulness of Henry Kissinger, the only figure in the Nixon administration who had acquired a reputation for what used to be called statesmanship. If Nixon has actually found it necessary to pay this cost in full anyway, we believe the reason must be weightier than an effort to add a few percentage points to an already assured election majority.

In our view, the most plausible explanation for Nixon's change of heart was spelled out in a Paris dispatch by Louis Wiznitzer, a veteran reporter on Vietnamese affairs, to the *Christian Science Monitor* of December 28. Wiznitzer begins by asking:

What happened to dash Henry Kissinger's hope that peace in Vietnam was at hand? What went wrong? What made the Ameri-

* It has become fashionable, especially on the Left, to denigrate the polls as unreliable or even worse. It is true that they can in effect be rigged by the way questions are posed, and that the results can be misused. But on straightforward issues like elections they are normally accurate within certain limits, and Nixon's indicated lead over McGovern far exceeded any possibility of statistical error. If there had been any signs of a late surge by McGovern, the situation would of course have been different; but there were none.

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cans renege—as the North Vietnamese see it—on the agreement reached by Dr. Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho in October?

In answering these questions, Wiznitzer first flatly rejects the line of speculation that Kissinger had gone beyond Nixon's instructions in drawing up the October draft agreement. The two were in such constant communication that "President Nixon, though not physically present in Paris at the time, participated directly in drafting the agreement." Further, the agreement "followed very closely Dr. Kissinger's 1969 article in the American quarterly *Foreign Affairs* with which Mr. Nixon must have been familiar." Finally, "in messages to North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong subsequent to Dr. Kissinger's conclusion of the draft agreement in Paris, Mr. Nixon never once questioned the text of the agreement but asked only for a postponement of its signing." Wiznitzer then proceeds as follows:

> The first sign of trouble with the October agreement came when Dr. Kissinger landed in Saigon and met, not so much with President Thieu—whose power to obstruct Mr. Nixon's policies informed observers here [Paris] consider nil—but with "U.S. officials" as he called them in his October 26 news conference.
>
> These officials included Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, a staunch Thieu supporter; General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff; and Vice Admiral Noel A. Gayler, U.S. Commander in Chief in the Pacific.
>
> According to reliable sources here, the military took a look at the freshly drafted agreement and did not like what they saw. Chalmers Roberts, for many years Pentagon correspondent for the *Washington Post,* expressed their feelings when he wrote, "The deal makes the survival of a non-Communist regime in the South very problematic."

Wiznitzer goes on to point out that the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon first made it a condition of their approval that signing be delayed for several weeks to permit a huge airlift of new arms to the Saigon regime, which "from Hanoi's point of view constituted a first act of 'cheating' by the Americans since Hanoi had agreed to the October draft on the understanding that it would be signed no later than October 31, and that the military and political status quo in South Vietnam would not meanwhile be changed." From there on it was all downhill,

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though it was "not until December 11 that Hanoi and the Viet Cong came to the conclusion that far from making a last-ditch stand for President Thieu, the Americans had in fact completely reneged on the October draft and were merely looking for an excuse to break off talks."

This view that Nixon changed his mind under prodding from the military finds confirmation in an article entitled "The Resumption of Bombing of North Vietnam" by Jacques Decornoy in *Le Monde* of December 20. Asking why Nixon "now rejects an agreement which apparently satisfied him two months ago," Decornoy mentions possible differences with Kissinger but stresses that "pressures, conforming to his most profound convictions, which could have been brought to bear upon him by the 'hawks,' both civilian and military, have certainly played a role." The phrase "conforming to his most profound convictions" is important. Ever since as Vice President he advocated U.S. intervention to save the French at Dienbienphu in 1954, Nixon has himself been one of the most ferocious hawks. What is now surprising is not that he repudiated the October draft but that he accepted it in the first place. One can only speculate that Kissinger, whose views are known from the 1969 *Foreign Affairs* article, won him over in October and then lost him to the Pentagon in November.*

What followed the breakdown of the talks in December is a logical corollary of this reconstruction of the events of October and November. We know from the Pentagon Papers and from other sources, chief among them Maxwell Taylor's autobiography *Swords and Plowshares,* that the generals have never ceased to believe that victory has eluded the United States in Vietnam because of restraints placed upon the use of airpower by Presidents and their civilian advisers. They have long wanted to flatten Hanoi and Haiphong, and it is reasonably certain that plans to that end have long been in existence. It is easy to imagine that they had little trouble convincing Nixon that now at last the time had come to turn the bombers loose.

Nixon accepted that advice, and the results have been per-

* It should be added that this does not imply that Kissinger ever acted against Nixon's instructions or wishes. On the contrary, when Nixon changed his mind, Kissinger dutifully scuttled the draft he had helped to draw up. He knows his place.

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haps even worse from his point of view than on earlier occasions when military advice on Vietnam has been accepted by presidents. The Vietnamese have not been cowed, as anyone who has studied the history of either terror-bombing in general or the Vietnam war in particular could have predicted.* The other side of the coin is that by bombing the heavily defended Hanoi-Haiphong area, Nixon, whose withdrawal and Vietnamization policies had so effectively insulated the feelings and conscience of the American people from the horrors of the war, has suddenly torn aside this veil and forced them once again to confront the tragic reality. An "aerial Bay of Pigs" is the way Wilfred Burchett describes the bombing campaign in one of his first-rate dispatches in the *Guardian* (January 3). Dozens of planes, including 35 B-52s by Hanoi's latest count, have been shot down, and scores of crewmen have been added to the lists of dead, missing in action, or prisoners of war. To many of us who have watched the tide of popular antiwar sentiment ebb and flow during these last ten years, the first signs of a new rise seem clearly discernible. Even the Congress, which in the past has fully shared the executive's responsibility for the whole shameful disaster, seems, as it convenes for the new session, to have a spark of antiwar potential. After all, if an establishment Republican like Senator Saxbe of Ohio can conclude that the bombings show that Nixon has "left his senses," it is hard to set limits to how far the spirit of rebellion against presidential tyranny might spread.

Nixon probably senses these things too, and his calling off of the bombing north of the 20th parallel at the end of December may be likened to his hasty retreat from his initial commitment to the Cambodian invasion in May of 1970. But this time there are other factors beside a possible renaissance of the antiwar movement tending to restrain the continuation of indecisive but extremely costly military operations in Vietnam.

* To anyone who had occasion to be intimately concerned with the results of area bombing during the Second World War, the photographs and eye-witness descriptions of physical devastation coming out of Hanoi and Haiphong have a sickening familiarity. But the accompanying casualty figures are amazingly low. This attests, as Telford Taylor who was in Hanoi during the bombings points out in a *New York Times* article of January 7th, to the extraordinary effectiveness of the Vietnamese system of passive air defense, including both evacuation and shelters.

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Chief among them, as we have often pointed out in these pages, is the rapidly deteriorating U.S. international economic situation. How well this is recognized in ruling-class circles, and what its implications are for the Vietnam war, were clearly shown in a *New York Times* Op-Ed piece (December 28), entitled "The Longest War," by Senator Stuart Symington, a former big businessman and former Secretary of the Air Force. We quote at some length from what we believe to be a very important statement:

> For some nine years I have been warning my colleagues about the growing danger to our economy that is inherent in our continuing unfavorable balance of payments, at first only in the public sector, now in the private sector as well. As the ratio of our assets to our liabilities continues to decline, this is causing increasing apprehension in all economic circles both at home and abroad.
>
> A visit earlier this year to the Far East, including Japan, as well as one last month to Europe, including various countries behind the Iron Curtain, convinced me that, in this nuclear age, everyone realizes that a military attack against the United States would be an act of suicide.
>
> These trips also convinced me that the next great struggle will be an economic war. If true, that bears in significant practical fashion on the great and growing danger of our continuing to pour additional billions of dollars into the Vietnam theater to achieve a military victory against that little country.
>
> Every American should consider that, as of now, we are just as unprepared to wage an economic war as we were unprepared militarily the day before Pearl Harbor.
>
> Let us hope that at this session of the Congress we, the representatives of the people, will face up to our constitutional obligation and demand all pertinent facts necessary for wise decisions with respect to the allocation of our resources. I believe a wise decision would be one that required an end to this sad and wasteful war.

Suffering from another in a long series of military defeats, threatened by a resurgent antiwar movement, and facing growing opposition within the big bourgeoisie itself, Nixon is in the unenviable position of seeing his options gradually narrow. He can no doubt temporize for a while, but there is no way out in that direction. Sooner or later he will have to come back to the kind of agreement he and Kissinger negotiated in October,

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tacitly recognizing defeat in the country's longest war. The alternative was implied by Nixon in his famous news conference of last July 27th when he stated: "We are not using the great power that could finish off North Vietnam in an afternoon, and we will not." That was a long time ago and before his latest frustrations. If the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong proves anything, it is that this man cannot be trusted not to use that power. It is up to all of us, not only opponents of the war as it has been conducted until now but also all who tremble at the thought of their country's committing this ultimate barbarity, to bring the maximum possible pressure to bear for an immediate cease-fire on terms already negotiated and agreed to.

(January 10, 1973)

They rob us of our land and put it under their ploughs,
They raze our homes and build military outposts.
Crying will not dissipate our anger,
Imploring pity will not open the way to salvation.

Guns and bombs are not our way of life,
We have never been friends of war,
But they have come armed to the teeth.
Shall we resign ourselves to slavery? Never!

Night after night under the palm trees,
Our land stirs, our people prepare for attack.
Our fighters' eyes shine in the darkness,
Watch the stars embrace the immense vault of heaven.

Forward we march, singing passionately of our beloved land.
Our blood and bones shall be the ramparts!

—Thanh Hai, *The Song of the Fighters*

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PAKISTAN: SWING TO THE RIGHT

BY FEROZ AHMED

> Driven by the contradictory demands of his situation and being at the same time, like a conjurer, under the necessity of keeping the public gaze fixed on himself, as Napoleon's substitute, by springing constant surprises, that is to say, under the necessity of executing a *coup d'état en miniature* every day, Bonaparte throws the entire bourgeois economy into confusion, violates everything that seemed inviolable to the Revolution of 1848, makes some tolerant of revolution, others desirous of revolution, and produces actual anarchy in the name of order, while at the same time stripping its halo from the entire state machine, profanes it and makes it at once *loathsome and ridiculous.*
>
> —Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

"Islam is our religion; socialism is our economy; democracy is our politics," was the slogan on which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) mobilized the masses of West Pakistan and scored an astounding victory in Pakistan's first general elections held in December 1970. If a slogan were to be adopted for the present policies and the style of the governing of Mr. Bhutto's regime, it would read something like this: "Radicalism is our rhetoric; confusion is our tactic; oppression is our profession." Mao's dictum, "Serve the people,"

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which was included in the PPP's arsenal of clichés, could be appropriately modified to read "Serve the imperialists."

In less than a year since coming to power, the People's Party government has taken an unmistakable and dangerous turn toward the Right. Informed analysts of Pakistan's political scene had never considered the PPP as even a social democratic party. But they had also not expected the swing toward the Right to be that swift and decisive. What appears clear now is the fact that, except for a self-serving populist rhetoric, Bhutto's government is shedding even the disguise of socialism and is coming out openly as a law-and-order bourgeois-feudal establishment.

Reforms that Maintain the Status Quo

When Bhutto assumed power in December 1971, he was faced with a public not only confused and demoralized by Pakistan's military defeat but enthusiastic about the "People's President," who would deliver them from their age-old exploitation and oppression. Bhutto responded to the mood of the people by continuing his populist style and rhetoric, developed during the election campaign. A series of "basic" reforms was quickly announced, and the people were reassured that their days of suffering and humiliation would soon be over.

Some of these reforms, especially the land reforms and the new labor policy, appear fairly radical on paper. A middle-class urbanite, already confused and sickened by the crude anti-capitalist propaganda on the government-controlled radio and television, is quite willing to believe that the "Chinese way" is being adopted in Pakistan. However, the workers and peasants whom these measures are supposed to affect have different ideas about the regime's policies. Their leaders have already begun to expose the realities of these policies.

Bhutto's land reforms are indeed unique for a bourgeois-feudal country in the sense that they provide for the taking of excess land without compensation and its redistribution to the tenants free of charge. The maximum landholding permitted by law is only 120 irrigated or 240 unirrigated acres per person. However, there are a number of loopholes in this prescription. Firstly, the holding is measured in terms of a 40-year-old

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index of produce units which would allow each landowner far more land than the government claims it would. Secondly, most of the landlords owning land in excess of the legal ceiling have already transferred their excess land to their family members and loyal tenants. Finally, the concessions granted to the ex-military officers and capitalist farmers would allow them to keep large tracts of land in excess of the legal limit. In reality, a very insignificant amount of land will be taken from the landlords, and very few tenants will benefit from it.

Some of the other provisions of the land reforms, which transfer from the tenant to the landlord the responsibility of paying revenue, water charges, and the cost of seed, cannot possibly be implemented without radically restructuring the society and changing its power equation. On the contrary, these provisions, as pointed out to me by the peasant leader Ishaque Mohammad, will tend to set the tenant against the small-owner and destroy the unity among the poor tillers.

Similarly, the new labor policy, the regime's showpiece of "socialism," has been rejected offhand by the militant labor leaders. Usman Baloch, President of the United Labor Federation, summarized the new policy in these words to me, "Ayub Khan had outlawed strikes, Yahya Khan allowed the formation of multiple unions in a single factory, and now Bhutto has conspired to create a union in each department of a factory by his shop-steward program."

Be Co-opted or Be Destroyed

The government's policy toward labor and the Left in general could be described as a policy of co-optation, containment, and destruction. The most vivid demonstration of co-optation and containment was given last May Day when the government declared the first of May an official holiday, and organized and participated in the workers' rallies. In the city of Lahore, where a mammoth May Day parade had taken place two years ago in defiance of the government, the workers were contained in trucks this time and prevented from mingling with one another. As soon as the official fanfare about the labor day was over, the Information Minister, who had presided over the official May Day *Mushaira* (poetry recital session), ordered

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the media to stop all propaganda against the capitalists. The President himself addressed Pakistan's industrialists and assured them that private capitalism would be protected and the workers' agitation would not be tolerated by his government. It was not without significance that he used the term *gherao-jalao* (encircle and burn) for the workers' actions—a law-and-order term coined by the capitalists and used by the reactionary politicians and press to discredit the workers' movement. (The fact remains that the workers have not burnt a single factory, and have resorted to *gherao* only when their managements have refused to deal with them with reason and decency.) As if acting on a cue, the capitalists started provoking the workers—in some cases even refusing to pay wages on payday. The stock market which had remained closed for five months opened with a bang.

The People's Party rhetoric, both during the election campaign and immediately after the assumption of power, has contributed a great deal to the rising expectations of the workers. But their economic conditions have continued to worsen, and their exploiters have become even more vicious, resorting increasingly to lockouts and retrenchments and demanding the crackdown on the labor movement as a precondition for resuming production.

Given the self-confidence and defiant mood of the workers, this increasingly intransigent attitude of the capitalists was bound to lead to serious clashes and create conditions in which the "People's government" could no longer maintain its "socialist" façade. The inevitable happened on June 7, when the management of the Feroze Sultan Textile Mills in Karachi, notorious for its practice of not hiring any worker continuously for more than three months, provoked a clash with the workers. The police fired indiscriminately without warning and killed about 40 workers in two days—a costly demonstration of what happens to those who refuse to be charmed and contained by the "People's government."

The Karachi massacre was only the beginning of what Bhutto meant by saying that the strength of the street would be met with the full weight of the state. In October the strike of the Landhi-Korangi industrial area was broken even more brutally. Police bulldozers rammed through the walls of the

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two mills occupied by the workers, who were then evicted at gun point. The police repeatedly resorted to shooting, in order to put down the protest demonstrations staged by the workers, killing dozens of laborers. The sympathy strike, though not complete, continued for almost a month. The government called in the army to force the workers to resume duties, set a deadline for the resumption of work, and authorized the capitalists to lay off workers at will. The Labor Minister also threatened to ban strikes. The number of workers thrown into jails or out of work runs into thousands.

Unable to offer workers crumbs from their table, the ruling classes and their government realize that they can no longer delude the workers with high-sounding slogans and gimmicky reforms. But the new alignment of forces which is emerging in Pakistan must have "peace and stability" in order to consolidate its hold. If the snake it had fostered refuses to be charmed and threatens to bite, then that snake must be killed.

The peasants of Punjab, who provided the bulk of votes for the People's Party, have fared no better. In a state of euphoria, created by the PPP's victory and reinforced by the propaganda about the "revolutionary" character of land reforms, some of them began to take the government at its face value, refusing to render the illegal, forced, and humiliating services which the landlords had been extracting from them for centuries, and resisting illegal ejections from land. Dera Ghazi Khan is one such place where the peasants, organized by the local PPP, refused to render *begar* (free service) to the landlords and resisted ejection by the police. The police and the bureaucracy, aided by the *goondas* of the landlords, unleashed a reign of terror against the peasants and the PPP workers. Dozens of them, including the district vice president of the PPP, were thrown into jails, tortured, and framed in criminal cases. Peace has now been secured for the landlords of the region by the "People's government." Small wonder that Balakh Sher Mazari and Nasrullah Khan, two of the most dreaded feudal lords of the region and legislators previously opposed to the People's Party, have now joined it and expressed their confidence in Bhutto's leadership. The constituency in which the PPP had failed to win a seat in 1970 despite mass support has

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returned a PPP member unopposed in the recent by-elections, without mass enthusiasm.

Liquidation of the Party Left and Alignment with the Non-Party Right

The case of the People's Party of Dera Ghazi Khan is by no means unique. Polarization of the party cadres and top leaders is proceeding rapidly throughout Pakistan. The young idealistic political workers, who had campaigned for the PPP in the name of socialism and emancipation of workers and peasants, are now discovering that there is no greater crime in the "People's era" than to plead the cause of the downtrodden masses.

The contradictions in Pakistan were such that Mr. Bhutto and the feudal-upper-petty-bourgeois leadership of the People's Party had to mobilize the workers, peasants, and students by promising them complete abolition of feudalism and capitalism, and "all power to the people." The trick worked insofar as getting the votes was concerned. But it also created a Frankenstein's monster in the form of a huge army of radical political cadres at the village and neighborhood level and some middle-echelon leaders, a few of whom managed to get elected to the Punjab provincial assembly. Given the class character of the Bhutto government and its present crisis, there is no way in which it can tame this mass of highly motivated political workers. A good majority of them have already been disenchanted with the PPP leadership and are drifting toward the militant Mazdoor-Kisan (Worker-Peasant) Party, which appears to be the most attractive alternative. However, this party, because of the disciplinary problems which the cadre influx is likely to create, seems reluctant to absorb all of them at once.

Many PPP activists, however, think that the more practical course for them for the time being is to organize a cohesive caucus or wing under the PPP banner. This has been done at the local level in a number of places in Punjab. But to coordinate these organizations and to give them a national framework is a task which only the PPP left leaders of national stature can undertake. Mr. Bhutto understands the dangerous

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potential of such a development. He is taking effective measures to isolate from the masses the likely candidates for this task. Mukhtar Rana, the popular militant from the industrial city of Lyallpur, was framed in a number of criminal cases, summarily sentenced to five years of hard labor, and deprived of his National Assembly seat. Mairaj Mohammad Khan and Sheikh Mohammad Rasheed were immobilized by being given powerless ministerial portfolios in the central government and by being identified with the regime's unpopular policies. (With his credibility damaged beyond repair, Mairaj recently resigned from the government, purportedly in protest against the October massacre.) The militant members of the Punjab provincial assembly, who dared to speak for the peasants, have been threatened with the fate of Rana. One of them, Fida Hussain, has already been indicted in a murder case because he championed the cause of the ejected peasants of Hafizabad.

It appears that the suppression of the leftist middle echelon leadership and cadres of the PPP is part of a conscious attempt to destroy the party as a grass-roots organization and to turn it into the usual type bourgeois-feudal party, communicating with the masses directly by means of circus-like public meetings and state- and party-controlled mass media. This view is supported by Bhutto's full-scale drive to build a grand alliance with the right-wing parties which had bitterly opposed the PPP in the elections. A notorious rightist leader, Abdul Qayum Khan, has been made the Home Minister, i.e., the chief of the witch-hunting agency. Qayum has already indicated that his Pakistan Muslim League would eventually merge with the PPP. The leader of another faction of the Muslim League, Mumtaz Daulatana, has resigned from the party leadership and accepted the post of Ambassador to the United Kingdom. His Council Muslim League offers no more than a token opposition to Bhutto's government. Many members of the third faction of the Muslim League, the Convention ML, were drawn into the People's Party during the election campaign and now occupy important government and party positions. Similarly, a large number of feudal lords and tribal leaders, especially in the Sarhad and Baluchistan provinces, who were elected to

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the national and provincial legislatures as independent candidates have now become prominent leaders of the PPP.

Having consolidated his position and frustrated the ultra-rightist attempt to weaken his government by creating language riots, Bhutto proceeded to obtain consensus from the recalcitrant parliamentary groups on matters of common interest to all factions of the ruling classes. The militancy of the masses convinced the ruling classes of the necessity of closing ranks. The radicalism of the people radicalized the thinking of the immature bourgeoisie. In October, when the police were busy killing workers in Karachi, representatives of all parliamentary groups had gotten together in Islamabad to sign an accord on the basic features of the new constitution. If anyone failed to notice the "coincidence," the statement of Abdul Ghafoor, who signed the accord on behalf of the fascist Jamaat-e-Islami, was refreshing: the accord had "definitely precluded the possibility of socialism or communism gaining ground in the country."

The Myth of Independence

Capitalism in Pakistan can grow only in the comprador form. The People's Party's emergent bourgeoisie, like the monopolist bourgeoisie into whose domain it has marched, knows this truism. It must not only accept partnership with the big bourgeoisie—instead of trying to replace it—but, like it, must attach itself to international imperialism. The deeper the domestic crisis grows, the sooner must it consolidate its alliance with the United States and the imperialist world. Furthermore, Pakistan's military establishment, a product of colonialism and neocolonialism, will need these alliances even more desperately once issues are settled with India, and it loses its *raison d'être,* i.e., confrontation with India. No wonder then that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the author of the *Myth of Independence* and the leader who had campaigned on a platform of nonaligned foreign policy, has lost no time in exposing his own myth of independence. He has publicly asked for the revitalization of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and for signing a new bilateral treaty with the United States. For the first time since 1965,

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Pakistan has sent a ministerial delegation to attend the CENTO conference held recently in London. The frequent exchange of visits with the reactionary Middle Eastern governments is yet another indication that Pakistan is becoming a pawn in the U.S. Mediterranean and Gulf strategy.

This collaboration between Pakistan and the United States need not be overt and need not tarnish the regime's radical image. The statements concerning the signing of a new bilateral treaty and revitalizing the CENTO may be retracted and never again repeated. Indeed, Pakistan recently withdrew from the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and recognized North Vietnam, North Korea, and East Germany. It may also withdraw from the CENTO. Does this indicate nonalignment? The Bhutto government says yes, but any regular reader of newspapers knows that New Zealand is also withdrawing from the SEATO, that Israel has made diplomatic overtures to North Vietnam, that North Korea and South Korea are talking to each other, and that the recognition of East Germany even by West Germany may not be too far off. What the regime does not mention is the enslaving bilateral treaties Pakistan signed with the United States in 1954 and 1959.

The mercenary duties performed by Pakistan so far have not all been open; and for a more effective future role, withdrawal from the embarrassing treaties may even be advantageous to both Pakistan and its imperialist masters. During my visit to Pakistan last summer, rumors were persistent that (a) Pakistani military personnel were vacating the Bada Ber base near Peshawar, evacuated by the United States in 1969, in order to make room for American reoccupation; (b) naval facilities were being constructed by the Americans near Gwadur on the Mekran coast—a location ideally suited for policing the Gulf; (c) military detachments were being sent to Oman, Trucial States, Jordan, and other reactionary countries of the Middle East; and (d) workers were being hired in Pakistan for the American base in Guam.

Since this last story got wide circulation in Pakistan, the government announced that it had put off recruiting personnel for the Guam base; it did not deny the existence of such a

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plan. Similarly, Pakistan may not have its divisions in the Middle East, but its involvement in Dhofar and Jordan on the side of the counter-revolutionary forces has been an open secret. In view of Pakistan's foreign-policy orientation the other two developments are also not unlikely. There could be argument about the specifics, but the general trend is unmistakably pro-imperialist. Such a policy is fraught with grave dangers, not only in terms of the response it might evoke from the USSR and India but also in terms of its domestic implications. The repression, already let loose against the people, is likely to intensify as the opposition to Pakistan's alliance with the United States grows.

It has been said about Bhutto that he is capable of doing what is impossible for other politicians. There can be little doubt about that, for no one else could have produced such a repressive and pro-imperialist regime under the banner of democracy and socialism. The irony is that in so doing he has also shattered the illusions about parliamentary politics and bourgeois-led multi-class parties.

Like Government, Like Opposition

Any discussion of Pakistan's shift to the Right would be incomplete without the mention of the character of its "original leftist" party, the National Awami Party (NAP).

Ever since its formation in 1957, the NAP had had the distinction of consistently advocating nonalignment, secularism, rights of the nationalities, land reforms, and civil liberties. Its "leftist" claims were legitimized by both the state repression against it as well as by the decision of the Pakistani Communists to use it as their mass party, creating an illusion among a good many revolutionary youths that the NAP was the disguised Communist Party.

During the 1970 elections, the NAP took a position to the Right of the People's Party (formed only in 1967) and denounced the latter for advocating socialism. Its leadership allowed its pro-Moscow allies to draft a program of "independent national democracy" and "non-capitalist economic development," used the regional grievances of Sarhad and Baluchistan

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for mobilizing mass support, and ran landlords and tribal leaders for assembly seats. The NAP emerged as the major political force in these two provinces, which contain barely 20 percent of the country's population, and formed coalition governments with the help of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam.

While the PPP leadership had exposed their reactionary character by the policies pursued federally and in the populous provinces of Punjab and Sindh, the NAP's performance was even worse. The measures taken by its government in Sarhad included (a) the launching of the most savage repression against the peasants in Pakistan's history; (b) the banning of labor strikes; (c) prohibition; (d) the issuance of an order banning the operation of restaurants and cinema houses during the fasting hours in the month of Ramadan; and (e) adoption of Urdu as the official language of the province—a measure shared by its Baluchistan counterpart.

These measures were intended not only to safeguard the interests of the classes NAP represents, but also to convince the Karachi-based monopoly capitalists and other law-and-order elements that it was the only viable answer to the People's Party's anarchy. The monopoly capitalists, who had used the military as their political party, were unnerved by the militant populism of the PPP. The ultra-rightist parties, whom they had supported during the elections, had performed so miserably that after the removal of the military regime, the monopolists did not know which party to support. Some still hoped that the postwar disorder would bring the military back to power —a hope not altogether abandoned—while the more enlightened ones decided to support the NAP. Uncle Sam's favorite Pakistani capitalist family, the Haroons—whose senior member, Yusuf, lives in New York—threw in their lot with the NAP at a very early stage and placed their chain of newspapers at the service of the party. Other capitalists, such as the Dawoods and Valikas, reportedly financed the NAP's national convention in Karachi.

But the secessionist image of the NAP was hard to stomach for most of the monopolists. The adoption of Urdu was precisely meant to demonstrate the "integrationist" bona fides of

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the party—a decision which alienated a large section of its middle-class supporters who wished to adopt Baluchi and Pushto instead. Similarly, the decision to drop the demands for a secular constitution and nonaligned foreign policy were partly designed to appease the monopolists and to create a "climate of investment" in Sarhad and Baluchistan. Capitalists from Punjab and Sindh were invited to these provinces and ushered in by none other than Mr. Ghulam Farooque, the man who in his capacity as the chief of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation played a leading role in the uneven development of the country—a model from which these very capitalists had gained and Sarhad and Baluchistan had suffered. Today, Mr. Farooque is an NAP Minister in Sarhad and has the responsibility of industrially developing that province.

The National Awami Party's efforts to placate the big capitalists cannot be explained solely in terms of opportunism. In an unevenly developed capitalist country the contradiction between the monopoly capitalists and the emergent bourgeoisie —consisting of the upwardly mobile petty bourgeoisie and the landlords striving to become industrialists—acquires a different character in the more developed or dominant regions and the industrially undeveloped or less developed regions. In the more developed regions, the emergent bourgeoisie, in order to get a slice of the industrial cake, attempts to break the power of the monopolies, whereas in the less developed regions the overriding concern is to create an industrial infrastructure, which is more easily accomplished through the established capitalists of the dominant regions who have the capital and know-how. The emergent bourgeoisie can then use its political power, based on regionalism, to assure that the crumbs of that industrial development accrue to it and no one else. If the regional governments of the NAP can exercise sufficient control over the industrial process and see to it that the construction and transportation contracts, wholesale agencies, managerial positions, and other service contracts necessary to the industrial development go to the Pushtun and Baluchi emergent bourgeoisie, and that the surplus of the landlords can be safely invested in partnership with the outside capitalists, then "foreign

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investment" will be in the best interests of the classes the NAP represents. Obviously, then, the "national bourgeoisie" of the pro-Moscow Communists, which desires to become a junior partner of the comprador bourgeoisie, can only be doubly comprador.

However, the big bourgeoisie, even if it is convinced of the NAP's "national" character, cannot treat Sarhad and Baluchistan as its refuge. It can neither transfer its industries and the economic infrastructure from Punjab and Sindh nor ignore 80 percent of the market and labor force. It must work out a deal with its challenger. Taking advantage of the adverse economic consequences of the separation of East Pakistan and the militancy of the industrial workers, it has convinced the emergent bourgeoisie of the PPP that it cannot successfully confront big capital. That the PPP government has understood the message is indicated not only by the repression of the workers but by the declining influence of the regime's most outspoken anti-monopolist, Dr. Mubashar Hassan.

The case of Pakistan has once again demonstrated the limited options open to the bourgeois factions in a neocolonial economy, and the impracticability of a country's extricating itself from the imperialist dependence while capitalist relations of production exist. It has also shown the futility of parliamentary politics as a means of social change in a neocolonial set-up.

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CHILE: AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION

The following communications reached us in December, too late for inclusion in last month's issue. They are no less timely today, however, since they illuminate the underlying situation on the eve of the March parliamentary elections. The author of the first is a member of the left wing of the Chilean Socialist Party who has written for MR before and in whose judgment we have the greatest confidence. The author of the second communication is a left-wing Spaniard who spent several months in Chile, including the period about which he writes.—THE EDITORS

I

The political situation in Chile has changed fundamentally in two months. The bourgeoisie, alarmed by the forward movement of the process, planned an all-out offensive that almost brought down the government: a strike by industrialists, shopkeepers, professionals, and transport owners, which had the support of virtually all the middle strata. It was a curious situation, almost without historical precedent.

(1) The working class (in industry, mining, agriculture, and construction) fought a defensive battle, i.e., it felt that it had been assaulted as a class by the business sector, and as a class it continued to go to work and keep the machines running, in most cases in the absence of management personnel and engineers, at times without even administrative personnel. It was a magnificent struggle, lasting twenty days, in which it was proved that the country could not be paralyzed by decision of the bosses. But it was a defensive struggle.

(2) The employers succeeded in mounting an extraor-

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dinary offensive action, and under their leadership large sectors of the petty bourgeoisie joined the struggle: virtually all professionals, from doctors to engineers, from lawyers (of whom only *Unidad Popular* [UP] members continued to work—fewer than 25 percent of the total number) to bank employees, and a small proportion of government bureaucrats. Their greatest success was the private-sector truck and shipping strike; only the railroads continued to function. Retail businesses were totally struck.

(3) After twenty days the strike began to lose strength, since the shopkeepers and truck owners were drained economically. At that moment Allende, using the army as intermediary, threw them a lifeline. He appealed to them to return to work, promising no reprisals and offering some minor concessions; in effect, he provided them with a face-saving way out of the crisis at a moment when they were already virtually defeated. And if they were not defeated? Then, in ten days or two weeks the factories and mines would have stopped for lack of transport, and there would have been thousands of workers in the streets, really desperate because they couldn't work, and *then* armed confrontation would have been inevitable. Therein lies the reason for the military cabinet, which intervenes in political life in order to avoid a confrontation, in order to avoid the overthrow of the political and economic power of the capitalists, in order to paralyze the political process.

Appointing two leaders of the *Central Unica de Trabajadores* (trade union federation) to the military cabinet as ministers of labor and agriculture was merely a device of Allende's—a way of concealing the real purpose of the military cabinet and protecting the image of the government in front of public opinion.

The politicized sector of the masses was paralyzed by surprise. For two years they had been told that a coup could come from the army, then suddenly the military is presented as the defender and savior of the UP government.

Details are lacking but it is known that Allende notified the Socialist Party that in Chile there is no process of construction of socialism, that his government is simply popular, na-

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tional, and democratic. Because it is legal it receives the support of the armed forces; because it is popular it receives the support of the workers. Nothing more. That is how he intends to end his term of office in four years.

There will be parliamentary elections in March. Allende's next step is to try to have the Christian Democrats join the government, and in this intention he is supported by a small "leftist" sector in the Christian Democratic Party. But for this to happen, the most important condition is that the extreme Right show a substantial increase of votes in the elections, winning some 25 to 30 percent of the vote. Since the UP will win roughly 40 percent, the Christian Democrats would then not be able to claim the right to leadership of the opposition and would have to consider an electoral alliance with the "Left."

The revolutionary elements are not strong enough to divert the process from its electoral path. Nor does the extreme Right have the strength to stop the March elections.

Once more it is the masses who must take the initiative, as they have done in earlier stages of this process. For them it is necessary (1) that another one or two hundred industrial enterprises pass over to the social sector, and (2) that an apparatus for distributing consumer necessities be set up, independent of the capitalist network, to be supported by landless peasants. But the masses have no political leadership. Once again the Communist Party limited itself to a call for "national liberation." The Socialist Party, which resisted the military cabinet until the last minute, yielded under the pressure put on it by Allende, by high government functionaries, and by its own right wing. The MIR is in crisis, and is not playing an important role.

Is a regrouping of left revolutionary forces possible? Of course it is. But nothing is ever easy for the Left. If now some among us are discouraged, it is precisely because we suffered from the illusion that the situation was better than it really was, that the process was irreversible, that we were already moving toward socialism. That was not and is not true. We must struggle much harder.

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II

The situation in Chile in military terms can be described as an encounter between an irrepressible force and an impassable wall. There is no longer a Center in Chile. That position, formerly occupied by the Christian Democrats, has simply disappeared. What remains of the Christian Democrats is aligned with the Right (which uses slogans such as: "Chile, United, Great, Free," and symbols such as the fasces). On the other side are the parties and groups comprising *Unidad Popular* (and now, in the crisis, the *Movimiento Revolucionario de Izquierda* [MIR]), which have been joined by the leftist sectors of Christian Democracy. There is no Center. The Right and the Left are roughly equal in strength, which leads to an unstable equilibrium. This is how the domestic situation looks, but there is also the fact that the Right is receiving massive support from the United States (financial, cultural, media) while the Left has no support outside Chile except that of Cuba and the usual international movements of solidarity. The struggle is, I think, too unequal. The UP is not adequate, but on the other hand it is necessary that it be maintained, that it not be destroyed if an authentic socialist revolution is to be achieved—in the sense of liberating human beings from the pressures that alienate them. Because, let's face it, the destruction of the UP would be the triumph of fascism. So the crisis precipitated by the traitorous Right—and this is no mere cliché—has at the same time revealed all the defects of the UP (the willingness to compromise, the timidity, the paternalism that leads to fear of arming the masses and calling them out on the streets) and all the phenomenal virtues of the working class and progressive Chileans: their discipline, their combative spirit, their enormous inventiveness.

When the strike of transport owners, shopkeepers, and industrialists began, not one worker followed them. The government worked out a plan so that the populace would be supplied with necessary goods. During that period it was almost impossible to make appointments with anyone—all the intellectuals were doing volunteer labor to help worker resistance. It was a fabulous experience to see leftists in a moment of crisis defend-

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ing the essential with a sense of discipline and truly admirable minimal unity. Best of all, paradoxically perhaps, is what I have seen in the way of the liberating capacity of human beings, the inventiveness of the workers in the intervened factories, who built new machine parts when the old no longer functioned. To see a factory of 2,000 workers with a twenty-seven-year-old manager, who completed elementary school only, resolving problems by telephone, with no documents in triplicate and no red tape in general, to see buses requisitioned by the masses so that they could go to work is a stirring experience.

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BOOKS

URBAN GUERRILLAS IN BRAZIL

By Richard Morrock

Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil by João Quartim. Monthly Review Press, 1971. 250 pp. $6.95; paperback, $3.45.

João Quartim's *Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil* is a carefully documented account of eight years of military tyranny in Latin America's most populous nation and a closely reasoned critique of the strategies followed by the left-wing underground groups which are now engaging in urban guerrilla warfare.

This book is not another *Revolution in the Revolution?* Régis Debray is one of the most vivid and persuasive writers the Left has produced since the Bolshevik Revolution. Quartim, on the other hand, is putting forth arguments on a much higher level of complexity; he is writing a text rather than a polemic. If Quartim's book is to have the same effect upon the Brazilian revolutionary movement that Debray's had upon the Latin American movement in general—and, hopefully, it will—it must first be summarized and rewritten in language which the ordinary Brazilian can be expected to understand.

Quartim's book consists of four chapters, preceded by an introduction. In the introduction, the author describes the politics of pre-militarist Brazil (1930-1964), when the country was polarized between the pro-Vargas and anti-Vargas camps. This division

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lasted for a decade after Vargas's suicide, with the followers of the deceased ex-president holding office more often than their opponents. Vargas's power base consisted of not one but several parties with contrasting ideologies, and resembled the coalition lined up behind Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal. Similarly, the opposition National Democratic Union included moderate, right-wing, and ultra-right tendencies, like the Republican Party. Half the population, illiterate and concentrated mainly in the backward Northeast, was excluded from the franchise. The Communist Party had significant support, but only in the big cities, particularly São Paulo.

In chapter one, Quartim describes what happened after the army ousted João Goulart in 1964. Goulart, a protégé of Vargas, was elected vice president in 1960 and reached the presidency when his predecessor, Jânio Quadros, suddenly resigned. The army was reluctant to allow Goulart to take office, and when he began moving leftward it stepped in and removed him in an almost bloodless coup. Originally, the military government was prepared to tolerate some dissent; but by 1968, after General Costa e Silva took over from Castelo Branco, the gloves were removed, and Brazil was placed under a malevolent despotism which uses torture on a scale even the Greek colonels might envy.

The reason for this hardening of military policy was the growth of opposition in wide sections of the population—the petty bourgeoisie (which had generally supported the coup in 1964), the students, workers, peasants, rank-and-file soldiers, and even part of the national bourgeoisie which felt betrayed by the regime's increasing subordination to U.S. interests. But by eliminating any possibility of peaceful parliamentary change, the Brazilian generals ensured the emergence of new forces which would fight for revolution. Interestingly, not one of the pre-1964 political parties has survived the last eight years.

Quartim's second chapter describes the absolute worsening of conditions for the masses of people under the dictatorship. The long-term impoverishment of the Brazilian masses began before 1964, and the military regime is the consequence, rather than the cause, of it. However, in the absence of any political opposition, the most defenseless groups in the country—the landless peasants and the Indians—have been exposed to the most ferocious persecution, which would have been unlikely under any bourgeois democracy, no matter how reactionary. Quartim even reports what appears to be an instance of the revival of slavery (which was abolished in Brazil only in 1889).

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The Brazilian *colono,* a kind of sharecropper who paid rent with his labor, is being transformed into an agricultural day laborer. The reason, apparently, is that the laborer's productivity increases substantially when he is paid for his work. However, the rate of exploitation of these landless peasants is increased by turning them into agricultural proletarians. The same development in Chile caused an upsurge in the level of political awareness among the landless peasants, and ultimately helped to bring Allende to power in 1970. In Brazil, this process of politicization may be hastened even more by the fact that many of the former *colonos* now commute to their jobs on the big estates from new homes in the urban slums.

Quartim also describes in this chapter the beginnings of extra-legal resistance among the workers and students. Of particular interest is his description of how a government-sponsored May Day demonstration was turned into an anti-government manifestation, with the official speakers forced to take ignominious refuge in a nearby church.

Chapter three deals with the growth of the revolutionary underground groups. These new movements draw their recruits from three sources: the student movement, the rank-and-file of the Communist Party, and dissident soldiers. The student movement was predominantly left-Catholic in 1964, but there was a strong Marxist faction called "Workers' Politics" (POLOP), out of whose more militant elements the guerrillas came. The Communist Party—i.e., the pro-Soviet PCB, as distinguished from the smaller, pro-Chinese PC do B—virtually fell apart after its strategy of working from within the Goulart government had come to nothing. One group that broke away was Carlos Marighella's Action for National Liberation (ALN), which began armed activities almost immediately. Another group, the Revolutionary Communist Party of Brazil (PCBR), began its own struggle somewhat later. The soldiers' and sailors' movements had played a major role in the radical upsurge in 1963-1964 which provoked the coup. Brazil, unlike most Latin American countries, has compulsory military service, which causes the generals to worry—not without reason—about "Communist subversion" within the armed forces. Some of the revolutionary soldiers have made common cause with the student groups, while others have linked up with the PCBR.

After 1968, the guerrilla groups began searching the country for an ideal location for an insurrectional *foco*—a Brazilian equivalent of Cuba's Sierra Maestra. Their attempts, in wooded mountains both northeast and southwest of Rio de Janeiro, were fail-

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ures. They did, however, discover that small groups of peasants throughout the country were collecting arms in preparation for guerrilla warfare. The PCBR is now trying to organize revolutionary peasants in the Northeast.

In the last chapter, Quartim gives his critique of guerrilla tactics and strategy. He endorses, first of all, the idea of armed struggle as the only possible form of resistance to the dictatorship; he specifically criticizes the pro-Soviet rump of the Brazilian Communist Party which states that "the masses in their millions" must first be won over to the revolution before armed struggle begins. He defends the concept of fighting in the cities, rather than the countryside, although guerrilla losses since 1969 would tend to indicate that Debray was not altogether wrong about the dangers of urban revolutionary work. One gets the impression that Quartim's model for the Brazilian revolution is the European resistance in the Second World War, rather than the Chinese or Cuban revolutions.

Quartim criticizes the negative attitude toward mass struggle held by some Brazilian guerrilla groups; the twin errors of militarism and "orthodox Debrayism" have been largely responsible for defeats in Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela, where little effort was made to struggle on any level other than armed warfare, and peasants and workers were not drawn effectively into the revolutionary process. On the other hand, he cautions against a too rigid application of Leninist theory and practice to Brazilian conditions. His strongest sympathies seem to lie with the ALN, which combines urban guerrilla warfare with support for mass struggle.

Finally, Quartim outlines three possible strategies for the Brazilian Left in the present period. The first, which he terms a rightist deviation, holds the bourgeois revolution to be incomplete, and looks to the national bourgeoisie for support against the regime. "Anti-imperialist struggle does not in this view involve anti-capitalist struggle." But, unlike prerevolutionary Russia or China, the Brazilian national bourgeoisie, in the absence of any need for an anti-feudal revolution, does not play a progressive role. The Brazilian national bourgeoisie is merely a junior partner of American imperialism, whose role is to manage the less profitable sectors of the national economy. It might attempt to wrest certain minor concessions from the dictatorship but is unlikely to join a revolutionary opposition. It is indicative of how irrelevant the Sino-Soviet dispute has become to the Latin American Left that Quartim's criticisms of this rightist deviation can apply equally to the pro-Soviet PCB and the pro-Chinese PC do B.

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What Quartim terms a leftist deviation holds that only the workers and poor peasants can be drawn into the struggle, that the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie are not worth winning over, and that the stated goal of the revolution must be socialism. The correct strategy, according to Quartim, is one which appeals to the petty bourgeoisie, which combines anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist activity without confusing the two, and which has the overthrow of the dictatorship as its stated goal.

The difficulty here is that the author fails to define what he means by the "petty bourgeoisie"—a somewhat overworked term on the Left—and that he does not distinguish between those elements of it, such as the students, who are in the forefront of the struggle, and those other elements, such as owners of grocery stores, bars, etc., who seem to be the most amenable to fascist demagogy. Furthermore, what he tells us about the countryside would indicate that the rural petty bourgeoisie—the rich peasants, or kulaks—is far less significant than in many other countries.

Quartim ends his book on a pessimistic note. "Victory is not inevitable because it is not inevitable that socialism will triumph." Given what he has told us about Brazil, it is hard to see how he could have reached that conclusion.

RESISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE WAR

By Cheryl Payer

Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War, by Daniel B. Schirmer. Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972. 298 pp. $8.95; paperback $4.95.

When the administration of President William McKinley made war on Spain in 1898 for the purpose of taking over Spain's colonial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific, it discovered that the natives of the Philippine Islands had themselves organized an army against Spain with the aim of winning independence

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Cheryl Payer has spent several months in the Philippines and several years in the Boston area antiwar movement.

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for their nation. America's colonial pretensions were novel at that date, its own history of anti-colonial struggle still remembered, and its belligerence against Spain disguised in part by anti-imperialist rhetoric about freeing the subject peoples, so that for a time the Filipinos believed that the Americans would aid them in their aspirations to nationhood. Admiral George E. Dewey and his subordinates in the Pacific command apparently shared this confusion for a time and gave the Filipinos promises of sympathy and support—until orders from Washington made it clear that annexation was the U.S. intent and that the native liberation army was a more dangerous enemy than the puny Spanish resistance.

By the time the Americans faced the Spaniards in the "battle" for Manila, the presumed opponents were unified by an agreement to keep the city out of the hands of the Filipino insurgents. The Spanish surrendered willingly to the Americans, and the latter found themselves in control of the capital but faced with the task of taking the rest of the country from an army and a people who wanted their own freedom. The resulting war, which continued as a campaign against guerrilla fighters for several years after the regular army had been disbanded, was extremely brutal and racist.

Daniel B. Schirmer has written an account of the decent Americans who were alarmed and dismayed by the wrong turning they saw their country taking in 1898. The jingoism in foreign affairs was matched at home by the triumph of industrial conglomerates and by the white supremacist policies which were negating the gains of the War of Emancipation. The troubled anti-imperialists sought to arouse the nation's conscience against the betrayal of the ideals of our own struggle for independence.

The work is both broader and narrower than its title would suggest. It is broader because it is not only a study of opposition to the Philippine War, but also of the history of the Anti-Imperialist League. Unlike many modern radicals, who began with the specific issue of war atrocities in Vietnam, proceeded to opposition to the war itself, and are now questioning American foreign policy in general, the earlier anti-imperialists started from a principled opposition to imperialism. This book shows, however, that as the anti-imperialists lost each successive battle they entered upon, they retreated from the general to the specific. From opposition to the war with Spain they retreated to opposing the peace treaty annexing the Philippines, then to criticizing the war against the Philippine revolutionaries, until finally they were re-

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duced, in their last campaign, to exposing the atrocities in the conduct of the war.

The book is narrower than its title because it focuses mainly on one area, the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts. The archival material on which it is based comes almost exclusively from this geographical region. Schirmer justifies this selectivity in his foreword by pointing out that the national leadership of the movement at that time centered in Boston, and furthermore that Massachusetts politics had simultaneously produced one of the leading proponents of imperialism and militarism, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Thus, writes Schirmer, "the duality and tension of this seminal crisis in American life developed with greatest clarity in Massachusetts politics, and they, in turn, had a significant effect on the national course of events."

This choice does, however, contradict the claim of the work to be a history of the anti-imperialist movement as a whole. The populist wing of the movement, although probably more significant socially and politically, remains a vague and shadowy presence in the background—even though headquarters of the League were for a time moved to Chicago in deference to its national character. The real motives of the millions of Americans Schirmer claims supported the anti-imperialists, and the sentiments of the rank-and-file members of organizations whose leaders associated with the movement, remain equally mysterious. This is in part a defect inherent in the materials available to the historian. One wonders, however, if the New England leadership was as distant from their supposed army of supporters as the reader feels him/herself to be; if so, it may be one explanation for the failure of the movement.

The core of the anti-imperialist leadership was formed by members of the Boston aristocracy: Harvard-educated sons of the Anglophile merchant-importer class which had suffered eclipse with the rise to power of the new industrial class. There is more than a hint here of Tory radicalism grounded in resentment at the rise of the vulgar new rich. One labor leader wrote frankly to Edward Atkinson, a League stalwart, that it was hard to get labor men to join a club with rich men.

The most sincere anti-imperialists seem to have been old men who were veterans of the abolitionist struggle, such as Charles Francis Adams and Gamaliel Bradford, men by that time in their seventies and eighties who struggled vainly against the resurgence of racism at home and abroad. The League contained many of the so-called Mugwumps, Republicans in the process of

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deserting their party because they saw it abandoning its liberal principles. Women were present—in nearly equal numbers with men—in the rank and file of the League, but they were not included in its leadership. It is a curious contrast with the present time that young men were almost totally absent from the movement. Apparently jingoism had preempted the idealism of the youth who were not totally concerned with making their fortunes.

Schirmer's strength is his familiarity with the modern anti-imperialist struggle, sparked by opposition to the war in Vietnam. Although explicit reference to Vietnam appears only in the foreword, the author's choice of topic and of emphasis throughout his study invites comparison of the earlier antiwar struggle with our own. Despite the differences mentioned above, the parallels are striking. Then, as now, the government lied, fabricated incidents as a pretext for aggression, made tactical retreats to appease public opinion, restricted operations in order to win an election, and then escalated hostilities as soon as the election was won. Then, as now, it initially underestimated the number of troops necessary to "pacify" the population and later escalated after getting a foot inside the door. Then, as now, the rebels relied, unwisely, on elections in the United States to change the face of the government they had to deal with. Then, as now, the anti-imperialist movement was divided over how far it was justifiable to go to protest an unjust war.

The Philippine revolutionaries, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, appear in this book as heroic but shadowy and unidimensional figures. There has been a tide of reappraisal by historians of the Philippine revolution in recent years; writers as diverse as Renato Constantino, William Pomeroy, and David Joel Steinberg have contributed to the debunking of the official heroes of that era, particularly Aguinaldo and José Rizal, as bourgeois sellouts. Without denying their findings, one can welcome Schirmer's viewpoint as a useful corrective. We are so used to considering the Philippine government as the U.S. government's monkey-on-a-string that we may forget how much Filipino blood has been shed, in that first revolution and in the postwar struggles, in unsuccessful attempts to break out of that straitjacket.

Schirmer attempts, in the same vein, to extract from his narrative a positive image for modern Americans. Previous writers of left sympathies such as Pomeroy and William Appleman Williams have "denied that the anti-imperialists were bona fide, claiming that they opposed only the colonial, not the non-colonial, forms of imperial expansion." Schirmer seeks to contradict this

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view—not very successfully—by showing that there were several sincere and highly principled persons in the leadership of the movement. His own evidence suggests, however, that the "millions" of Americans who supported the movement at its height were probably motivated by private interests or racism: agricultural interests feared the competition of Philippine plantation products; the Boston Irish working class expressed a nationwide fear of cheap Asian labor; Southern whites disliked the prospect of closer association with millions of brown people; and antiwar American soldiers in the Philippines complained that they "did not enlist to fight niggers."

Schirmer also claims that the decency of the American people is demonstrated by the fact that imperialism could never operate openly, without some idealistic rationale. Senator Lodge and his associates exploited the anti-imperialist tradition when they promoted war with Spain to "free Cuba from the Spanish yoke," Schirmer points out, "and American imperialism came to the fore under the banner of anti-imperialism." "From first to last," he concludes, "hypocrisy was the tribute the imperialists paid to the power of the American democratic tradition and its hold upon the mass of the people."

This is small comfort, and hardly enough to outweigh the shame of that era and of the succeeding ones. (Indeed, in arguing that the imperialist policy represented a new departure in American history, the author ignores the earlier history of the country, and most notably the extermination of the Indians—a term, incidentally, which American soldiers frequently used for their Filipino adversaries.) Public scruples have proved to be all too easily pacified by a few comforting words from our Presidents, which seem to relieve our conscience without altering the situation.

The Philippine revolution was destroyed by a policy of savage repression combined with promises of office and land to leaders who would collaborate, and a vague pledge of eventual independence. The anti-imperialist movement at home capitulated when the administration renounced the policy of direct annexation and settled on "Open Door" imperialism. It was the tribute of hypocrisy, but it was defeat, not victory, for the handful of sincere anti-imperialists. Schirmer recognizes this, but he also still shares their hope "that the struggle they initiated would go on, in other generations if need be, till their cause was triumphant."

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THE OLD BUILDINGS

BY PEDRO PIETRI

(1422 amsterdam avenue)
everybody knew
everybody else
everybody respected
& loved everybody else
unity was happening
whenever somebody
cooked pasteles
everybody in the building
was invited to eat
this is how together
everybody was in
those days (city hall
saw this harmony happening
and got intimidated
because there is nothing
that frightens
this government more
than seeing people
living and loving
and breathing together
so they decided to
demolish the buildings
that could have been
saved by renovation
& eliminate the unity)
everybody was moved
away from each other
to so called better places
where you do not know

Pedro Pietri is the author of *Puerto Rican Obituary*, a collection of poetry to be published by Monthly Review Press.

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anybody when you move in
& you do not know anybody
when you move out
dead or alive or in
a straight jacket
the system tailored
especially for you and
all your close relatives
who came here looking
for better days and
finding the worst nights
of their existence (as
they went from funeral
parlor to funeral parlor
looking for coffins
that were not too expensive)

Improvements of towns, accompanying the increase of wealth, by the demolition of badly built quarters, the erection of palaces for banks, warehouses, etc., the widening of streets for business traffic, for the carriages of luxury, and for the introduction of tramways, etc., drive the poor into even worse and more crowded hiding places. On the one hand, everyone knows that the dearness of dwellings is in inverse ratio to their excellence, and that the mines of misery are exploited by house speculators with more profit or less cost than ever were the mines of Potosí.

—Karl Marx, *Capital* (Moscow: Progress Publishers), Vol. I, pp. 657-658.

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
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CORRESPONDENCE

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD

Paresh Chattopadhyay's article "On the Political Economy of the Transition Period" (MR, September 1972) is a valuable contribution toward the clarification of a subject whose political implications place it right at the heart of the struggle for socialism.

So it is with no hair-splitting motive in mind that I take issue with one of the author's formulations; one that, in my view, weakens his whole presentation. In paragraph 6, section (3), Part I of his article the author states, "The *domination* of capitalist relations by socialist relations—in a transitional society—excludes exploitation of the workers, but the very *existence* of capitalist relations implies the possibility of restoration of capitalism, that is, the exploitation of workers by those who control the employment of the means of production."

No issue need be taken with the second part of the quote. By now, the thought expressed is almost a truism.

The sticker is in the first section, and in the author's unqualified "excludes." To my mind it contradicts all the main themes of the argument. They point to the opposite conclusion, as expressed by his emphasis on the *ownership/possession* contradictions.

If it were indeed true that the dominance of socialist relations over capitalist relations in the transitional period *excluded* exploitation, why all the fuss and worry? But just *that* is the rub! It doesn't. True, a battle has been won. But the war is far from over.

For me it is easier to express the situation in political terms. The conquest of state power by the working class and its allies is only the first in a long series of political struggles. Whether a transitional society will go forward to socialism or regress to capitalism depends on the outcome of these struggles.

William L. Fisch

October 8, 1972
Teaneck, New Jersey

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

grown to increasingly unmanageable proportions. We regret this very much but can see no way to avoid it. Please don't interpret this as meaning that we don't want to hear from you: quite the contrary. It is only meant to explain and apologize for what will often seem the slowness and inadequacy of our response.

Subscribers sometimes complain about the slowness of the magazine's delivery. We are very well aware of this problem since we keep our own names on the sub list to check on time of delivery. One of us living in an inner suburb within 25 miles of Columbus Circle got the December issue on January 6th. We know what other subscribers are not in a position to know, that it was mailed out during the first week in December. Under the circumstances complaints are definitely in order, but they should be addressed to the Post Office Department which seems to consider little magazines expendable in spite of their having to pay the same rates as commercial publications which receive far more favorable treatment.

Decent people who are disgusted and sickened by U.S. killing and destruction in Vietnam naturally want to do what they can to help the heroic victims. There are an increasing number of channels through which this can be done. For those who may not know of any, we list the following: (1) Medical Aid for Indochina, 474 Centre Street, Newton, Mass. 02158; (2) Collecte Vietnam, C.P. 283, Succursale Outrement, Montreal, Canada. Both groups will welcome contributions and provide suggestions for further activity.

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Let us close with a beautiful passage from a letter from an inmate of a California prison: "The getting together of the Vietnamese people from nothing to fight the French and then the U.S. for many years was something great within itself. To withstand all the strafing, bombs, chemicals, and whatever else the almighty dollar dished out for so many years, is proof of their belief. I know for myself that Vietnam has already won and will continue on exposing the contradictions of its oppressor. They knew from the start they would win, for they planned on a long, long fight, and from this they changed opinions throughout the world. Vietnam is proof to the world of how a people can get together to withstand a force greater than themselves. I take more than my hat off to them. And one more thing, this prejudice feeling I've had toward Orientals all my life, because of TV and the news and the rest of the brainwash, is leaving me, thank God." Amen.

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